

# **PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS & SADC::**

**CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNT**

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## **Introduction**

The fundamental problem that humans face is that needs are insatiable, yet resources are limited. Resources can include, water and timber, minerals, oil, etc,. Where two or more communities have competing needs, this is bound to lead into conflict of all proportions, including killing. Africa's diverse races and cultures are a blessing. Yet, when faced with resource constraints these ethnic differences can be used to trigger violent conflicts.

In Southern Africa, conflicts have been resolved successfully in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, and to some limited success in Democratic Republic of Congo. Lessons learnt in resolving violent conflict in these countries can be used to inform SADC on how future conflicts can be managed using PSO.

The objective of this study is to produce a comprehensive analysis and recommendations for the implementation of all aspects of peace support operations (PSO) in SADC. Conceptual and historical literature on UN peacekeeping and current issues in global collective security and peace support missions and literature on African and SADC peace support missions will be used.

The research is qualitative in nature, and focused at both conceptual and technical levels. Analysis of key policy documents and statements of the AU and SADC (e.g. protocols and strategic plans) will be done. Interviews with key decision-makers and practitioners in AU, SADC and at national level will be carried out. Interviews with key actors will provide the important supplementary information. The findings of the study will help policymakers in developing programmes and activities for training and other capacity-building initiatives for PSO in SADC.

The paper is structured as follows; there is a background to theoretical premises of peacekeeping and mandates for UN peacekeeping missions; followed by 4 anecdotes of case studies from the SADC region; and recommendations for peace support operation that SADC might wish to consider.

## **Background**

At the global level, the primary aims of the UN are set out at the beginning of its charter: Article 1(1) which states that one of its central purposes is to maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace (**Bellamy et al, 2004**). Decisions about when to intervene, how to intervene and what resources to employ in a particular intervention are political, complex, multi-dimensional and contested. Specific measures for intervention by UN are set out in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI deals with measures that can be taken with consent of the belligerents. These measures include negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies. Chapter VII arrangements were originally designed to facilitate collective security activities but are now also used to authorize use of force by peacekeepers.

According to Bellamy (2004) when to intervene in a conflict is the role of the Security Council of the United Nations, a body whose permanent members have varied ideas

about the way to maintain international peace and security. This question is further complicated by the fact that in the past, peacekeeping missions have been authorized by both the General Assembly and regional organizations. Recognizing that efforts to make peace must begin with the individual, affected or unaffected, regional organizations must show initiative in resolving conflicts on the African continent. The challenge for SADC is to see the relationship with the UN and OAU as a holistic partnership in which all parties contribute in their own right. To place every problem at the foot of the UN because it is the world body responsible for peace and security, is not a positive attitude (Anyidoho, 1997).

Three types of violent conflicts are recognised; interstate war, within state warfare and political/ethnic warfare (Hampson, Fen Osler and Malone, David M, 2001). The general trend is that such conflicts are on the decline world-wide. However, experience has shown, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, that peace agreements in Africa are often fragile. There is no need to be complacent about management of conflict at any one time. The following diagramme illustrates life cycle of a conflict, consequences and possible management.




Figure 1. Cycle of Violent Conflict Management  
(Adapted from Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada)

Durable peace or stable peace is achieved through routine diplomacy, tolerance, transparency and accountability amongst all parties or interest groups involved in the conflict. When peace becomes unstable and tensions rise, preventive diplomacy should be initiated. Whistle blowers such as NGO's and church groups must do everything possible to prevent violent conflicts to occur. Some analysts criticize

romanticizing peace support operations as these wait for an outbreak of civil war to occur, then a ceasefire and then an agreement which is acknowledged by the United Nations (UN) before a peace force moves in to contain the conflict (**Neethling, Theo, 1999**). Crisis diplomacy is required as soon as an outbreak of violence is eminent, but much more important are routine and preventive diplomacy. The interventions by former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in the crisis in Zimbabwe may have prevented violent interstate conflict. There is need for strategic coherence in how conflicts are prevented and managed in the SADC region.

The historic summit meetings by the fathers and founders of peace building in Southern Africa, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia cascaded in the formation of a number of bilateral agreements. **Cawthra et al. (2007)** point out such institutions as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the current frameworks such as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Pact of SADC are a culmination of that consultation. These institutions and frameworks fulfill the vision of the founders in principle. However, in practice, that vision becomes blurred, albeit to mention that regional organizations have brought substantial benefits in increased stability and confidence and in conflict prevention.

Chapter VIII, Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the UN Charter provide for cooperation between UN and such regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. This opportunity has been grossly neglected and under-utilized (**Dodds et al., 2005**). **Cawthra et al. (2007)** observe that sub regional organisations have acted more as building blocks for regional and global collective security than as stumbling blocks. SADC should therefore live up to expectation as expressed in the declarations, treaties and protocols. To understand the dilemma facing SADC in PSO we need to study on a case-by-case basis because peacekeeping is contested in nature.

The following is the approach of the analysis. As far as possible, each case study was reviewed in the context of background to the conflict, group of friends<sup>1</sup>, agreements of parties to the conflict, mandate for the mission, troop contributing countries, mission activities, termination of mission and lessons learnt.

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<sup>1</sup> A group of friends to a country in conflict are generally countries with interests in the country either directly or indirectly. These are the ones who usually assist to prop up the United Nations to assist a country when it is facing problems.

## **Case studies**

### **CASE 1: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

#### **A. The UN mission in Congo (ONUC) 1960 - 1964**

The Democratic Republic of Congo has a history which dates back to the 7th and 8th Centuries AD whereby the area was populated by Bantus who are believed to have come from the present day Nigeria (**Gondola, 2002**). The area during its history has been known as Congo, Congo Free State, Belgian Congo and Zaire. The country initially became a personal colony of King Leopold of Belgium through the exploits of Henry Morton Stanley, the explorer. It later became Congo Free State and was run like a corporate state privately controlled by Leopold II King of Belgians through a dummy non governmental organization, the Association Internationale Africaine from 1885 - 1908 (**Ankomah, B., 1999**). During this period the country was subjected to a lot of mismanagement and cold blooded killings during rubber collecting expeditions. A lot of people died during the period mainly due indiscriminate war, starvation, reduction of births and tropical diseases. By 1908, public pressure and diplomatic manoeuvres led to the end of Leopold II's rule and to the annexation of Congo as a colony of Belgium know as the Belgian Congo.

Belgian Congo came under the administration of the Belgian parliament, a system which lasted until independence was granted in 1960. The educational system was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church and protestant churches and the curricula reflected Christian and Western values. There was little regard for native culture and beliefs. Native schooling was mainly religious and vocational. Political administration fell under the total and direct control of the mother country (Belgian) and there was no democratic institution. These factors may be the reasons and possibly the origin of the country's political problem. People were never really given an opportunity of taking responsibility for their future. They did not own themselves. Native curfews and other restrictions were not unusual. Following World War II some democratic reforms began to be introduced but these were complicated by ethnic rivalries among the native population. Later in the mid 50's agitation for independence became a prominent issue.

According to **Lemarchand (1964)** the period 1960 - 1965 saw a series of riots and unrest. At this point the Belgians realized they could not maintain control of such a vast country and decided to relinquish control. Congo was granted independence on 30 June 1960 with Joseph Kasavubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister and adopted the name Republic of Congo. By coincidence the French colony of middle Congo also chose a name close to the one of Congo which was Republic of Congo upon obtaining its independence. In order then to be seen to differentiate the seemingly similar names of the two countries, one was commonly known as Congo - Leopoldville and the other, Congo Brazzaville which were names after their capital cities.

At the time of independence, the country was in a very unstable state. Regional tribal leaders held far more power than the central government and with the departure of the Belgian administrators, there was almost no skilled bureaucrats left in the country (Meredith M, 2005) The first Congolese University graduate was only in 1956, and virtually no one in the new nation had any idea of how to manage a country of such a size.

Despite gaining political independence, the new country had a few military officers, so it kept many foreign officers as it trained its own military leadership. This brought resentment in the Army whereby privates and NCOs saw little opportunity for advancement in an Army officered almost entirely by Belgians. Further discontent was caused by the decision by President Lumumba to raise the salary of all government employees except the military. All these events led the soldiers to mutiny against their white officers and to attack numerous European targets. Looting and terrorizing the white population became rampant at that time. As a result of this, thousands of Europeans fled to Brazaville and Stanleyville. These events led to military intervention into Congo by Belgium in an effort to secure the safety of its citizens. According to **Weirs (1967)**, Belgium sent its troops to the Congo without the agreement of the Congolese government for the declared purpose of restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals. Whilst the danger to Belgian citizens was real, the re- entry of these forces was a violation of the national sovereignty of the new nation as it had not requested Belgian assistance.

As these events took place, on 11 July the province of Katanga in the South East with the support of Belgian interests and over 6,000 Belgian troops declared independence as the state of Katanga led by Moise Tshombe. (**Kanza, 1979**), Katanga was one of the richest and most developed areas of the Congo. Without Katanga, Congo would lose a large part of its mineral assets and consequently government income.

Tshombe believed that if he allowed the mutinous Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) to enter Katanga, it would result in lawlessness and bloodshed. With Belgian assistance Katanga's Gendarmerie was converted into an effective military force. At the core of the Katangan Forces were several hundred European mercenaries many of which were recruited in Belgium. Almost from the beginning they faced a rebellion from the north in Luba areas. This was led by a political party called Association of the Luba people of Katanga (Balubakat) when in January 1961, Balubakat leaders declared independence from Katanga (**Crawford Y, 1965**).

The events of the Belgium forces intervention and the secession of Katanga forced the Congolese government to request the United Nations military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against external aggregation.

### **Group of friends**

In the case of Congo at that time it can be seen that many countries had interest in it because of its vast mineral resources. In this context Britain, Canada, France, USA, Japan, Spain and neighbouring countries were the group of friends. The group of friends are usually very important as they assist to pressure the United Nations to make a decision to intervene in a country to pacify a conflict situation. The countries neighbouring Congo are Tanzania, Central Africa Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zambia and Sudan. It can be concluded that at that time most of these countries were not well developed politically and as such possibly did not participate fully as part of the group of friends.

### **Agreements**

There wasn't a formal agreement between the conflicting parties in the Congo for the UN Mission to be deployed. What transpired was that the President (Joseph Kasavubu) asked the UN for help on the situation in Congo. On 13 July 1960, the Secretary General then Dag Hammarskjöld addressed the Security Council at a night meeting and asked the Council to act with speed on the Congo request. This was odd and unique case. At the same meeting a resolution was taken to assist the country. The process of making agreements used by Congo to attract the attention of the UN for its assistance was quite different from most of the peace keeping missions. SADC countries need draw lesson from the Congo experience in regards how agreements can be made and effected in order to conform with modern practice of entering into agreements. The scenario in terms of the agreements was very different from the practice of modern times peacekeeping, where agreements would generally involve all the conflicting parties but usually mediated by the UN.

### **Mandate**

The acceptance of UN to the Congo's request led to the creation of United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian Forces, to assist the Congo government in maintaining Law and Order and to provide technical assistance. The Mandate of ONUC was a Chapter VII of the UN charter which meant that it was designed to enforce peace. However with the situation changing on the ground later, it was subsequently modified to a status which included maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations command and all mercenaries (**Keith Kyic, 2006**). This meant that in implementing its mandate ONUC was authorized to use force if necessary. This is exemplified by resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961 and resolution 169 (1961) of 42 November 1961. The SADC as a regional grouping need to understand the importance of mandates and resolutions for peace support operations and that these may not be hard and fast on the ground. They can be adjusted to suit reality on the ground.

### **Troop contributing countries**

The operation/mission attracted participation of many countries. The countries who contributed troops included Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. Considering the structure of modern day SADC, no country within the grouping participated in the mission. The reasons regional countries did not have any peacekeeping troops could have been lack of commitment to peace initiatives or possibly that they did not have appropriate expertise to effectively manage peacekeeping operations as a cohesive region.

### **The mission activities**

The UN activities in Congo during this mission initially religiously adhered to the mandate. The activities were focused on helping the Congolese government to restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo, maintain law and order throughout the country and to put into effect a wide and long range programme of training and technical assistance. In a general outlook, the operation leaned towards a chapter VI Charter of the UN. As time went by the atmosphere changed and moved to peace enforcement as per mandate. The events which pushed this determination included the succession of South Kasai and Katanga which led Prime Minister Patrick Lumumba to be dissatisfied with the UN after his request was turned down to subdue the renegade provinces (Kasai and Katanga) and to request for military assistance from the Soviet Union who responded with an airlift of Congolese troops to invade Kasai. This action by Lumumba resulted in a bloody campaign which caused the death of hundred of Baluba tribesmen and the flight of a quarter million of refugees from the area. What followed was political disintegration in the country (**Cruise O' Brien, 1962**).

Political disintegration occurred after president Kasavubu dismissed Prime minister Lumumba, and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Due to these events the UN was mandated to protect the Congo from outside interference, particularly by evacuating foreign mercenaries and advisers from Katanga and preventing clashes and civil strife by force if necessary as a last resort.

In trying to achieve the dictates of the new mandate (which came into force in early 1961) the UN mounted the following operations:-

- Operation Rumpunch:  
UN Forces disarmed Katanga troops, captured key Katanga military assets and arrested all the foreign mercenaries who had formed the core of the Katanga gendarmerie. It was successful initially but failed to meet its objectives as they did not completely finish it
- Operation "Morthor":

“Morthor” is a Hindu word for “smash” and was planned to round up foreign mercenaries and political advisors. The operation did not go on very well from the start and resulted in a Battalion of 155 UN troops from Ireland being attacked and trapped in Jadstville and the Secretary General at that time Dag Hammarskjöld being killed in an aircraft crash as he was trying to intervene on the situation on his way to a meeting in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) (Young C, 1965).

- **Operation Unokat:**  
This operation was planned and executed to remove road blocks and to take control of strategic positions around Elizabethville after the UN had discovered that the gendarmerie were setting up the road blocks in order to isolate UN units from one another. After heavy fighting the Katanga military assets and newly created Katanga Force were neutralized
- **Operation Grand Slam:**  
This was an operation which was launched by the UN on Katanga political and military infrastructure. This proved to be a decisive attack and ended the secession of Katanga.

### **Termination of the mission**

The termination of ONUC began in 1963 after Katanga had been integrated into the national territory of the Congo at the request of the Congolese government. However, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964.

### **Lessons Learnt**

In spite of their close proximity, regional countries did not have any peacekeeping troops in Congo. Many of these countries were still under colonial rule and conflicting interests and therefore, there could have been lack of commitment to peace initiatives or possibly, they did not have appropriate expertise to effectively manage peacekeeping operations or participate fully as part of the group of friends.

The vastness of the country and complex cultures of the country can prevent effective execution of the UN operations. The presence of mercenaries, third parties to the conflict, complicates a simple solution to the country's problems. Further, involvement of superpowers and their interests in the natural resources of the country complicates peace support missions, with consequent changes to the mandates. As a result, political tensions can prolong, as evidence by the launch of operation Dragon Range in Congo, whereby the Belgians and Americans were requested to assist.

### **B. Mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic Of Congo (MONUC)**

The background of the establishment of the mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo originated from the first and second Congo wars. The first Congo war began in 1996 as Rwanda grew increasingly concerned that members of the Rassemblement Democratique pour le Rwanda Militias, who were carrying out cross border raids from Zaire were planning an invasion. The new Tutsi dominated government of Rwanda protested such violations of territorial integrity and began to give arms to the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge of Eastern Zaire. This intervention was vigorously denounced by the Mobutu Government of Zaire. However despite this denunciation, he did not have any military capability to oppose and any political capital to spend on the issue. With active support from Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, Laurent Desire Kabila's rebel forces known as Alliance des Forces Democratique pour la Liberation ADU Congo - Zaire (AFDL) moved methodically down the Congo River. The force encountered only light resistance from Mobutu's crumbling regime based in Kinshasa. The bulk of Kabila's forces were Tutsis and many were veterans from the conflicts in the great Lakes region of Africa (**McGreal 2008**). Kabila himself had credibility because he had been a longtime political opponent of Mobutu and had been a follower of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of independent Congo who was murdered and overthrown from power by a combination of internal and external forces and replaced by Mobutu in 1965 (**Weiss, 2000**).

Kabila's Coalition Army began a slow movement westwards in December 1996 near the end of the Great lakes refugee crisis. He took control of border towns and mines and solidified his control in these areas. In March, 1997 Kabila launched an offensive and demanded the Kinshasa government to surrender. He conquered Kasenga during the same month and completely threatened the government. Although the government was denying the rebels success, negotiations were proposed in late March and, on April 2 a new Prime Minister was installed in the name of Etienne Tshikedi, a long time rival of Mobutu (**Gondola A, 2002**). Kabila at this time in control of a quarter of the country dismissed this as irrelevant and warned Tshikedi not to be part of it. Kabila's forces continued to press on for their success to overthrow the Kinshasa government throughout the months April and May. By May they had reached the outskirts of Kinshasa. As a result of Kabila's forces pressure and its arrival on the outskirts of Kinshasa, President Mobutu fled the country. This resulted in Kabila securing victory and seizing the control of Kinshasa. These achievements forced Kabila to proclaim himself president of the country and ordering a violent crackdown to restore order in an attempt to reorganize the nation (**Edgerton, R, 2002**). When Kabila gained control of the capital in May 1997, he renamed the country, Democratic Republic of Congo. During this period, he encountered substantial problems in regard governing the country. There were political problems from various political groups who wanted to gain power, a huge external debt and a big problem of his external backers unwilling to leave when asked especially Rwandans. To ease some of these problems, Kabila dismissed his Rwandan Chief of Staff and ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan military forces to leave the country. The people most alarmed by such a move were

the Banyamulenge of eastern Congo who had backed Kabila to come to the reins of power. This scenario resulted in all those who had backed him to rise against him. According to **Weiss (2000)**, this was the cause of second Congo war.

The second Congo war reached levels which could be interpreted as a conventional war between multiple national armies. This situation was however stabilized in 1999 as battle lines were seen to have calmed. After this period, the conflict was fought for much of the time by irregular proxy forces with little change in the territories held by various groups (**Edgerton, 2002**). In early August a well armed rebel group, Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) composed primarily of Banyamulenge and backed by Rwanda and Uganda emerged. This group quickly came to dominate the resource rich eastern province, based its operations in the city of Goma and took control of the towns of Bukavu, Uvira in Kivu. In addition to this, the Tutsi led Rwandan government allied with Uganda and Burundi also retaliated by occupying a portion of Northern Congo.

In order to remove the Rwandans from Congo soil, President Kabila enlisted the aid of the Hutu militants in Eastern Congo and began to agitate, public opinion against the Tutsi. This resulted in public lynching in the streets of Kinshasa. The Rwandan government in retaliation and in order to solicit support for its action against Congo alleged to its nationals that Kabila was organizing a genocide against their Tutsi brethren in the Kivu Region. Further to this, they also claimed a substantial part of Eastern Congo as originally to have been Rwandan. The Rwandan intervention in many's eyes was seen as a move to for its own regional aspirations and that it was only using the desire to protect the Banyamulenge as a smoke screen (**Gondola, 2002**). As a result of the support of the RCD by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, more towns on the eastern side of the Congo fell amid a flurry of ineffectual diplomatic efforts by various Africa nations. By August 13, less than two weeks after the revolt began, the rebels held the Inga hydroelectric station that provided power to Kinshasa and the port of Matadi through which most of Kinshasa's food passed. During the same period, Uganda, while retaining joint support of the RCD with Rwanda, also created a rebel group called the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) (**Thomas Turner, 2000**). The rebel offensive was abruptly halted as Kabila's efforts at diplomacy bore fruit. Congolese in the east and west showed a strong nationalistic sense and did all they could to reject the second invasion of Rwandan and Ugandan forces in their land.

The first African countries to respond to Kabila's request for help were fellow members of Southern African Development Community (SADC). While officially the SADC members are bound to a mutual defence treaty in the case of outside aggression, many member nations took a neutral stance to the conflict. However, the governments of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola supported the Kabila's government. Chad, Libya and Sudan later joined the conflict on the side of Kabila. This situation signaled that a multisided war had begun (**Weiss, 2000**). Fighting went on at an intensified pace as the rebels seemed determined to overthrow Kabila in his capital Kinshasa. The intervention by the foreign forces saved the Kabila

government and pushed the rebel front lines away from the capital. The problem however, was that these forces were unable to defeat the rebels. On 18 January, 1999 Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia agreed on a ceasefire at a summit in Windhoek, Namibia but the meeting left out the RCD. This resulted in the fight continuing. Outside Africa most States remained neutral but urged an end to the violence. A number of western companies most notably from USA, Canada, Australia and Japan supported the Kabila government in exchange for business deals. These actions attracted substantial criticism from human rights groups (**Fergal Kean, 2003**).

In April 1999 tension developed within the RCD as a result of the dominance of the Banyamulenge and reached a peak when Ernest Wamba dia Wamba moved his base to Ugandan controlled Kisangani to held a faction named forces of renewal. A further break in the RCD occurred when Museveni of Uganda and Kabila signed a ceasefire accord on 18 April in Sirte, Libya following mediation by Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refused to take part in this event. Rebel factions met to try and create a common front against Kabila. Despite these efforts, the creation of Uganda of the new province of Ituri sparked ethnic clash of the Ituri conflict sometimes referred to as a "War within a War". Nevertheless, the diplomatic circumstances contributed to the first ceasefire of the war. According to Gondola, in July, 1999 the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was signed by six warring countries (DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and Namibia) and MLC while RCD refusal to sign.

Under the agreement, forces from all sides under a joint military, commission would cooperate in tracking, disarming and documenting all armed groups in the Congo, especially those identified with 1994 Rwandan genocide although few provision were made to actually disarm the militias. The UN Security Council deployed about 90 Liaison Personnel in August 1999 to support the ceasefire. However in the following months all sides accused the others of repeatedly breaking the ceasefire and it became clear that small incidents could trigger attacks. The tension between Uganda and Rwanda reached a breaking point in early August 1999 as units of the Uganda people's Defence Force and the Rwandan Patriot Army clashed in Kisangani. The ceasefire and the tension which were frequently building between the belligerents paved way for the establishment of a United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

### **Group of friends**

The group of friends which facilitated the MONUC establishment included USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Belgium and France, Zambia, Tanzania and some SADC countries. The reason for them to agitate for peace in the Congo was that they had their national companies in the country who were involved with mining activities. Whilst for the neighbouring countries was basically the fear of the conflict overflowing to their countries of origin. Over and above this, some were also mindful of the various natural resources which were being obtained from the

country as raw materials for their industries. This meant that they had a lot of business interests in the country and felt that the war was not a good thing for their interest as eventually this could result in their economies being affected negatively. It is interesting to note that at the point in time SADC countries took a very active part in the efforts to push for peace in the DRC. Zambia and Tanzania offer a very good example of the SADC spirit in this context.

### **Agreements**

The presence of MONUC in the Congo was basically as a result of Lusaka agreement which was signed on 17 July 1999 backed by UN Security Council resolution 1258 of August 6, 1999 which authorized the deployment of a maximum of 90 Officers. The Lusaka agreement was signed by all the six countries which were fighting Congo and the MLC while the RCD refused to sign. Another agreement which was important to the conflict was the Pretoria agreement which was signed on 30 July 2002. Under this agreement, it was agreed that all foreign forces who were fighting in Congo had to withdraw. This was a very important agreement as it paved a way to de conflict the situation.

### **Mandate**

The mandate of the mission fell under a Chapter VII of the UN Charter in which the UN Security Council authorized MONUC to take necessary action in the areas of deployment of its Infantry Battalions to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (UN, 1999 - 2006). However due to a deteriorating security situation endangering the peace process as a result of the withdraw of 2000 Ugandan troops, a second mandate over the initial one was established. In this mandate, the same Chapter 7 of UN Charter was floated and under the Security Council resolution 1493, which authorized the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia with a task to secure the airport, protect internally displaced persons in camps and civilians in town, impose an arms embargo and to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district including the North and South Kivu as it deemed it to be within its capabilities (UN, 1999 - 2006).

This was a very strange scenario whereby one mission had two mandates - a Chapter 7 and another Chapter 7 mandate. This is a true reflection of flexibility and a move away from traditional peacekeeping to modern peacekeeping techniques. It also signified a more vibrant, robust and resourceful UN in terms of decision making.

### **Troop contributing countries**

Participating troops in UN mission usually include military and police personnel. The countries which contributed troops in DR Congo for MONUC and are still deployed are:

a. Military Personnel

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri-Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

b. Police Personnel

Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, France, Guinea, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

Currently as at August 2008, MONUC strength was 1838 uniformed personnel, including 16668 troops, 670 Military Observers and 1051 Police. It is pleasing to note that four SADC countries are among the peacekeepers in DRC. These countries are Malawi, Zambia, Madagascar and South Africa. This gesture shows the commitment of SADC countries in the endeavours to bring peace to the region and the world as a whole.

**The mission activities (implementation)**

The activities of MONUC in DRC generally follow the dictates of the mission's mandate. The following are the activities which are done to satisfy the mandate. These activities are on going as the mission has not yet been terminated.

- Phase I - A Liaison Force to determine the feasibility of the mission.
- Phase II - Establishment of MONUC, Chapter 7 mandate with 3400 troops and 500 Military Observers involved with monitoring and verification of ceasefire and disengagement agreement.
- Phase III - Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement.
- Phase IV - Authorization of interim emergency multinational force in  
Bunia and robust mandate expansion

- Phase V - Military force restructuring, mandate re-conceptualization and clarification under Chapter VI to use preventative force.
- Phase VI - Post transition – continuation of tasks from Chapter VII expanded the mandate to include post transition challenges in security sector reform and effective governance and requests for drawdown and plan for exit strategy.

The activities clearly point out to a situation whereby certain aspects were embarked on to quell situations which had developed. This is a very important area as it shows that peacekeeping plans can never be rigid but need to be flexible to accommodate changing situations.

### **Lessons Learnt**

Implications of a Chapter VII mandate has to be made clear at the outset, especially in a multi-ethnic society that is illiterate and that does not understand the importance of peace. Otherwise monitoring and verification of the ceasefire agreements can be hazardous, with breakdowns in the rule of law and violations of human rights. A careful study of the mission area and its activities required before any deployment of a peace mission is vital.

### **CASE 2: MOZAMBIQUE**

Mozambique is a country which is inhabited by Bantu speaking people who migrated from the north through the Zambezi river valley and then gradually into the plateau and coastal areas of the country. These were farmers and ironworkers. The second group of importance in the history of Mozambique is that of Arabs who lived along the Indian Ocean Coast and were mostly traders in gold, ivory and slaves. After the Arabs, Mozambique was visited by the Portuguese. The Portuguese as time went by colonized the country (**Zahoor, 2000**). This they did by making their trading posts and forts as regular ports of call on their route to India. Later, traders and prospectors penetrated the interior regions seeking gold and slaves. Although Portuguese influence expanded, its power base was limited and only exercised through individual settlers who were granted extensive autonomy. The Portuguese policies were designed to benefit the white settlers and the Portuguese homeland. As a result, they paid little attention to the native's national integration, economic infrastructure or the skills of the population.

After World War II, while many European nations were granting independence to their colonies, Portugal clung to the concept that Mozambique and other Portuguese possessions were overseas provinces of the mother country. As a result of this, many Portuguese nationals immigrated to the country. These moves agitated the

natives to establish anti-colonial groups. According to **Mwakikagile (2006)** several anti-colonial groups formed the front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 1962. This grouping initiated an armed campaign against the Portuguese colonial rule. The last 30 years of Mozambique's history reflected political developments elsewhere in the 20th century. Following the 1974 coup in Lisbon, Portuguese colonialism collapsed. In Mozambique, the military decision to withdraw occurred within the context of a decade of armed anti-colonial struggle, initially led by American educated Eduardo Mondlane who was assassinated in 1969. FRELIMO took complete control of the territory after a transition period as agreed in the Lusaka accord which recognized Mozambique's right to independence and the terms of power transfer. This led to Mozambique becoming independence on 25th June 1975. When independence was achieved, the leaders of FRELIMO's military campaign rapidly established a one party state allied to the Soviet bloc and outlawed rival political activity. FRELIMO by acting in this manner, eliminated political pluralism, religious education institutions and the role of traditional leaders (**Mwakikagile, 2006**).

The action of the ruling regime led by Samora Machel drew the wrath of the nation and forced others to establish a resistance movement in 1975, called Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). It was an anti-communist group (**Canen, 1994**). The new government gave shelter and support to South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe (ZANU) Liberation Movement. In retaliation to the Mozambique's action, the Rhodesian Intelligence, South African Apartheid government and the United States started supporting the RENAMO. RENAMO in its tactics attacked transport routes, schools and health clinics and as these activities were perpetrated, a civil war erupted in Mozambique.

In 1984, Mozambique negotiated an agreement (Nkomati accord) with President PW Botha of South Africa at Nkomati Port in Mozambique. In this Mozambique was to expel the ANC operatives in exchange for South Africa stopping support of RENAMO. This agreement did not quite hold as violations were the order of the day on each side. Samora Machel conceded failure of socialism and championed the need for major political and economical reforms. As this status quo continued, in 1986 President Samora Machel died in an air crash in South African territory. Machel was replaced by Joaquim Chissano as President and continued the reforms as was wished by his predecessor. He even started peace talks with RENAMO.

As Apartheid was crumbling in South Africa and support for RENAMO was drying up from South Africa and America, the situation paved way for the first direct talks between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. As a result of this, a new constitution was adopted in 1990 which provided for a multiparty political system, market based economy, free elections and guaranteed democratic rights (**Abrahamson, 1995**). On 4th October 1992, after a devastating 14 years Civil War, Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, president of the Republic of Mozambique and Mr. Afonso Dhlakama president of RENAMO signed an agreement in Rome, which was negotiated by the Community of Saint Egidio with the support of the United

Nations. The war ended on 15 October 1992 as per the agreement and called for the United Nations' participation in its implementation.

### **Group of friends**

The group of friends who pushed for the mission in Mozambique included Portugal, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Roman catholic Church – Rome among the many. It is believed that without their effort the mission would otherwise not have taken shape. This could have meant a protracted period of the civil war in Mozambique. Neighbours like Zambia and Tanzania played a very big role in this grouping. Their involvement in the process suggest an old history of good neighborliness in the SADC region.

### **Agreement**

The agreement concerning the peace deal was signed in Rome (Rome Peace Agreement). It was signed by Mr Joaquim Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, president of RENAMO. The agreement established the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in Mozambique. The agreement called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring those elections (**Young, 1991**). In addition to guaranteeing the implementation of the agreement and settlement of disputes, in 1993 under the same UN arrangement it was agreed to establish a supervisory and monitoring commission. This was established and was composed of the Mozambique government, RENAMO, Italy (mediator state), France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States (observer states at the Rome talks) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It should be appreciated from this arrangement that the parties involved in the peace talks did not want a degeneration of the conflict hence the establishment of the commission. Other agreements which were signed between RENAMO and the government on 3rd September 1993 were:

- To integrate into the state administration all areas that had been under RENAMO control.
- The impartiality of the national police. It was agreed to request the United Nations to monitor all police activities, public or private to monitor the rights and liberties of citizens and to provide technical support to the Police Commission established under the Rome agreement.

### **Mandate**

The mandate for the United Nation Operation in Mozambique was structured within a Chapter VI Charter of the United Nations (**Juergensen 1994**). Usually under this chapter, it is believed that there is consent between the conflicting parties to a peace deal and the UN is only brought in as a broker using a peacekeeping

force. ONUMOZ was established by a Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. The mandate of ONUMOZ was:

- To monitor and verify the ceasefire the separation and concentration of forces, the demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons.
- To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups.
- To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors.
- To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process.
- To coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular these relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population.

The ONUMOZ mandate was carefully designed to meet what was agreed at the Rome Peace Agreement Forum. It appears that most of the areas which were determined and anticipated to be sticky for the implementation of the agreement were properly covered. This was a very good example of mandate formulation. The SADC grouping can use this scenario as its template for mandate planning at its level.

### **Troop contributing countries**

Troop contributing countries are very important factors in as far as the implementation of a peacekeeping mission is concerned. This requires a very careful selection by the UN after meeting the consent and approval of the belligerents in the conflict country. In the case of ONUMOZ, countries which contributed troops after the required and recommended process were:

Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Russian federation, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Togo, United State and **Zambia**.

The mix of the countries really represented the international dimension coupled with expertise from those countries who had participated in similar missions elsewhere. Botswana and Zambia were the only countries which represented the SADC. This was a very good thing to do as their participation enhanced SADC's peacekeeping capability.

## **The mission activities (implementation)**

ONUMOZ activities were quite many but the most notable ones were as follows:

- **Deployment of the military component.**  
The military was responsible for security of the corridors and main roads which was achieved by conducting road and aerial patrols by vehicle and train escort details. ONUMOZ troops also provided installations protection by guarding them while the military observers conducted inspections into allegations of ceasefire violations and assisted in the preparation of assembly areas.
- **Assembly and demobilization of troops.**  
The Security Council Resolution 882 (1993) urged the parties to commence assembly of troops in November 1993 and to initiate demobilization by January 1994 with a view to ensure the completion of demobilization process by May 1994 in accordance with the time table. The ONUMOZ troops successfully met these challenges and the result was very satisfactory.
- **Ceasefire**  
ONUMOZ monitored the ceasefire agreement using the ceasefire commission. It must be mentioned however, that violations were relatively very few. This could have been as a result of the commitment of the parties to the peace deal. The exercise was divided into three categories namely; illegal detention of individuals, alleged movement of troops and occupation of new positions.
- **Formation of the Mozambique force.**  
A joint commission for the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force was formed. The United Nations approved the Lisbon declaration by which France, Portugal and the United Kingdom set out a programme aimed at assisting in the formation of the new unified Army. ONUMOZ facilitated the activities of the training and transportation to the required locations of this force.
- **Electoral process**  
ONUMOZ assisted with security during the electoral process. This involved guarding of personnel installations and provision of security during the conduct of the very critical stage of the peace process (elections).
- **Humanitarian programme**  
ONUMOZ provided the security and transportation of relief items. This was a great challenge as at that time the country's road infrastructure was infested with mines which were planted over the long period of the protracted civil war. This meant that ONUMOZ troops were also involved in the determining activities of the country. In summary, the ONUMOZ supported the

repatriation process, demobilization of the armed forces, emergency relief delivery and the restoration of essential services and mine clearance. ONUMOZ activities clearly manifested a complex work environment but dealt with expeditions through expertise of the ONUMOZ troops. Although many problems came in the way of the peacekeepers, the activities conducted by them ensured the success of the mission. ONUMOZ is regarded highly in the history of the UN as it was very successful in bringing peace to Mozambique

### **Termination of the mission**

The country's first multi party elections were held in October 1994. These elections were monitored by an additional 2,300 civilian international observers including some 900 from the United Nations. The government's party FRELIMO, won the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. The new parliament and President were inaugurated on 8 and 9 December 1994 respectively. Its task successfully fulfilled the mandate of ONUMOZ formally came to an end at midnight on 9 December. However ONUMOZ continued to carry out residual functions until the mission was fully liquidated at the end of January 1995. The termination of ONUMOZ after being successful was very remarkable especially to the SADC region. This was because peace in Mozambique meant peace to other countries of the region as well.

### **Lessons learnt**

Any peace support operation requires good planning for it to succeed. Commitment to peace through agreements by conflicting parties is very important for the follow up UN mission. Integration of two conflicting parties in a national force is one way of achieving a lasting peace.

## **CASE 3: ANGOLA**

### **Background of the Mission/Conflicts**

#### **A. UNAVEM I**

Angola became independence from Portugal in 1975. At this time, the guerilla war had gone on for a period of 15 years.. Just soon after the independence, a civil war began. The Portuguese had sought to establish a program of transition to independence at Alvor in Portugal with the warring parties. The agreement forged at Alvor fell apart and the groups started to fight one another with support from other countries (**Kapuscinski, 1975**). The war featured conflict between two primary Angolan factions, - the Communist Movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the anti-communist - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Apart from the two, there was a party called the Front for the Liberation of Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). This party was an association of separatist militant groups who were fighting for the independences of Cabinda.

In addition to the war's two primary factions (UNITA and MPLA), Soviet Union and the Eastern block supported the MPLA and were fighting the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). FNLA was an organization based in the Bakongo region of the North and was allied with the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Mobutu Government of Zaire. The United States, apartheid South Africa and several other African Nations also supported Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the total independence of Angola whose ethnic and regional base was in the Ovimbundu heartland of Central Angola.

The conflict, as it progressed, attracted the involvement of the Cubans. These initially operated behind the Soviets while the French backed FLEC and Zaire. During the period 1975 and 1976 most of the foreign forces except for Cuba withdrew from Angola. The surprising feature was that Cuba instead of a drawdown increased its troops from 5,500 to 11,000 in February 1976 (**Glejesis, Piero, 2006**). A lot of incidents took place between this period and the 80's. These incidents included the Shaba invasions of the Congo, Cuba military intensification of operations together with the MPLA and Dos Santos coming to power after the demise of Augustino Neto.

The 1980's saw SWAPO increasing their activities in the fight for their independence from South Africa using Angola as its base. This forced South Africa to send troops back into Angola and UNITA receiving massive aid from the Americans and them. As a result of this situation, the war intensified in Angola whereby in 1988 from 13 January to 23 March, South Africa and UNITA fought MPLA's at its base at Cuito Cuanavale in Cuando Cubango (**Saney 2006**). This was translated as the second largest war after El Alamein in sub Saharan Africa since World War II. The intensity of this battle forced both sides of the conflict to come to a negotiating table in New York and Geneva. According to Pazzanita (1991), this resulted in all the parties, through their representatives (Angola, Cuba and South Africa) signing the New York accord on December 22, 1988, whereby South Africa granted independence to Namibia and the others ended the direct involvement of foreign troops in the civil war. In a swift reaction, the UN passed a resolution later that day creating United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNVEM). The agreement provided for the implementation of a United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and measures to achieve peace in the region. Angola and Cuba also signed an agreement on the staged and total withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, a condition for South Africa's acceptance to the independence plan for Namibia (**Glejesses, 2006**).

### **Group of Friends**

The group of friends for the Angola conflict was quite huge. The reasons for this could be the country's enormous natural resources which include crude oil and diamonds. Among the many the following were the most notable:- USA, Germany, Canada, Japan, China (People's Republic), Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Argentina. Group of friends at most times are the ones who lobby for a crisis to be

resolved by the UN. Usually the reasons for their involvement can be business interests, former colonial power attachment and sometimes being in a region where they feel their interest can be interfered with. It is interesting to note that Zambia and Tanzania, now SADC members, were among the group of friends.

### **Agreements**

The agreements which were signed to ignite the establishment of UNAVEM I were generally two (2). The first one was the New York agreement which was signed by representatives from the governments of Angola, South Africa and Cuba. This agreement paved way for the independence of Namibia and the ending of the direct involvement of foreign troops in the civil war and implementation of the UN plan to bring peace in the region. The agreement resulted in the UN Security Council to pass resolution 435 (1978). The second agreement was the one which was entered into by Angola and Cuba to withdraw Cuba's 50, 000 troops. This was a precondition for South Africa to grant independence to Namibia and to stop supporting UNITA

### **Mandate**

The mandate of UNAVEM I was to verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola, in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two governments under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The mission was established by Security Council Resolution (1988) of 20 December 1988 at the request of the governments of Angola and Cuba. The mandate fell under Chapter VII.

### **Mission activities**

UNAVEM I became operational on 30 January 1989, when an advance party of 18 military observers arrived in Luanda to verify the departure of the first 450 Cuban soldiers. The figure of military observers later swelled. Military observer teams verified and recorded all movement of Cuban military personnel and equipment into and out of Angola in particular in the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda and Nambe and Luanda airport. They also confirmed Cuban redeployment in accordance with the agreed plan, northwards from all locations south of the adjusted 13th parallel. The withdrawal proceeded at a rate slightly ahead of the projected time as can be justified by a notification to the Secretary General of the decision by the governments of Angola and Cuba to complete the withdrawal more than one month before the scheduled date. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991. It can be observed from what happened during UNAVEM I, as a demonstration of what can be achieved by the UN peacekeeping operation when it receives the full cooperation of the parties concerned. UNAVEM I was a very successful UN operation. Reasons could be that the relationship of Angola and Cuba was good and that each one of them had become tired with the war and possibly wanted a relief.

## **Termination of the Mission**

UNAVEM I was terminated on 25 May 1991, a period of one month before the scheduled time. On the same day a ceremony was conducted to mark the completion. On 6 June 1991, the Secretary General reported to the Security Council that UNVEM I had carried out its mandate fully and effectively.

## **Lessons Learnt**

Most missions usually have problems to be completed. The UN in this context was very successful on what it had planned to do in a country of conflict because of the positive attitudes at that time of the leadership of the parties involved.

## **B. UNAVEM II**

UNAVEM II basically had its roots to the period just after the end of UNAVEM I when foreign troops were withdrawn from the country. Political changes abroad and military victories at home allowed the government to transition to a nominally democratic one. Namibia's declaration of independence eliminated the Southwestern front of combat as South African forces withdrew to the east. The MPLA abolished the one party system and rejected Marxist-Leninist style of government and defined Angola as a democratic state based on the rule of law (**Brittain, 1998**). The international community taking advantage of the developments, saw a window of opportunity to end the long standing conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA. In 1990, the government of Angola and UNITA began a series of talks with participation by Portugal as mediator and United States and Soviet Union as observers. The negotiations eventually resulted in peace accords known as "Bicesse accords" (**Pazzanita, 1991**). The accords were signed by president Dos Santos and Savimbi in Portugal on 31 May 1991. Through these accords UNAVEM II was to be established.

### **Group of friends**

The group of friends for UNAVEM II was similar to the one in UNAVEM I. The only addition was Cuba as an interested party in the matters of Angola.

### **Agreements**

The Bicesse accords, as already mentioned, were signed on 31 May, 1991 by President Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi in Lisbon, Portugal. The accords included four (4) documents: a ceasefire agreement, fundamental principals for the establishment of peace in Angola, concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the government and UNITA and the protocol of ESTORIL. At the request of the government of Angola, it was agreed that for the UN was to participate in the implementation of the peace accords and through the Security Council decision.

### **Mandate**

The mandate given to UNAVEM II was established by the Security Council Resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was to verify the arrangements agreed to by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan Police during the ceasefire period. On 24th October 1992, the mandate was enlarged to include observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections in Angola through Resolution 747 (1992). After renewed fighting in October 1992 between the government of Angola and UNITA forces, UNAVEM's mandate was adjusted in order to help the two sides reach an agreement on modalities for completing the peace process and at the same time, to broker and help implement ceasefires at the national and local levels through Resolutions 803 (1994) of 20 January 1993 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 834 (1993) of 1st June 1993.

UNAVEM II was authorized to verify the initial stages of the peace agreement in connection with the peace agreement signing on 20 November 1994 by the government of Angola and UNITA. The adjustment of the initial mandate and the others that followed indicates that the situation in Angola in terms of security and the agreements was deteriorating. This situation gives an example of how the UN can be flexible in the way it makes its decisions to adopt to the changing scenarios.

### **Troop contributing countries**

The countries who contributed troops for this mission were as follows:

Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia and **Zimbabwe**, the only SADC country. The length of the list tells a story of what was happening in the country. This shows that each time a mandate was adjusted, more troops became necessary. Another factor which possibly forced such decisions could have been the intensity of the operations.

### **The Mission activities (implementation)**

The implementation/activities included verification of the ceasefire, observation of the electoral process, further efforts to restore the peace and activities leading to the Lusaka protocol. The verification of the ceasefire phase went on well although with a few problems where observance of provisions was affected by antagonism and misunderstandings as well as logistical problems especially on the administration of troop assembly areas. This resulted in delays to achieve certain activities on the time table. These delays undermined confidence and trust between the parties.

The observation of the electoral process involved the creation of an Electoral Division which was mainly the concern of military police observers and the civilian staff on. The Division was responsible as a UN department to observe and verify the elections. As this was being done, the Police got involved with the verification of the local police's neutrality. The electoral process went quite well but after the results were announced, UNITA rejected the results and fighting broke out again. During

this period, UNAVEM worked to maintain the ceasefire, patrolling troubled spots and used its offices to foster dialogue between the parties. The problems continued and in order to reverse the situation after a lot of international intervention, the government of Angola and UNITA started talks that culminated into the Lusaka protocol.

### **Lessons learnt**

- Logistical difficulties in peace support operations that lead to delayed deployment after an agreement can undermine confidence between the parties
- Lack of restraint by both conflicting parties (government and UNITA).
- Rapid changing situations leading to adjustments of the mandate.

### **Success and failures**

- Verification of the ceasefire conducted efficiently.
- Demobilization process had been achieved to a certain extent.
- Difficulties to contain the fighting after the elections.
- Logistical problems.
- Delays in the planned activities resulting in reschedule.

### **C. UNAVEM III**

The deterioration of the security situation in Angola during the period of UNAVEM II was caused by UNITA's rejection of the election results. This caused heavy fighting to begin. In this situation, the UN continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan parties and interested countries including in particular, the observer states to the Peace Accords – (Portugal, The Russian Federation and the USA). These efforts culminated into the Lusaka talks to commence. Agreements in the areas of military, police, completion of the electoral process, the new UN mandate and the role of the three observer states were tackled. The last item on these talks was the mechanism for implementing the Peace Accords and a planned Lusaka protocol meeting. Through these talks, the Lusaka protocol was planned (**Brittain, 1998**).

The Lusaka protocol was a comprehensive peace agreement which was initiated on 31 October 1994 and signed on 20 November 1994. It consisted 10 annexes, each relating to a particular issue on the agenda of the peace talks, and covering legal, military and political issues. The Lusaka protocol was the meeting which ushered in the establishment of UNAVEM III. It should be noted that the protocol's provision, integrating UNITA into the military, a ceasefire and a coalition government were similar to those of the Alvor agreement that granted Angola independence in 1975.

### **Group of friends**

The group of friends for UNAVEM III was the same as the one which forged the establishment of UNAVEM II.

### **Mandate**

The UNAVEM III mandate was established within a Chapter VII of the UN Charter through Resolutions 976 (1995) of 8 February 1995. It was focused to assist the parties to restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords, the Lusaka protocol and the relevant Security Council Resolutions.

### **Troop contributing countries**

The complexities of the conflict in Angola forced the UN to increase the strength of the troops and the countries contributing. The total figures were 700 Military, 260 Police Observers and 700 Civilian Staff. These came from the countries involved in UNAVEM II and Ukraine, Poland, Romania, **Tanzania and Zambia.**

### **The Mission activities (implementation)**

The activities of UNAVEN III mainly stemmed out from the Peace Accord for Angola, the Lusaka protocol and the relevant Security Council Resolutions. The detailed activities included supervising, controlling and verifying the disengagement of forces, monitoring the ceasefire, verifying information received from the government and UNITA regarding their forces as well as all troop movements, assisting in the establishment of quartering areas, verifying the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of UNITA forces and most of the security areas pertaining to the holding of the second round of presidential elections and verification and monitoring of the electoral process.

### **Termination of the Mission**

The date designed by the council for the completion of UNAVEM III was February 1997. Notwithstanding many positive developments, the implementation process fell substantially behind schedule. Over this fact, lack of mutual trust between the government and UNITA jeopardized the attainment of lasting peace. The council realizing the continued delays and unfulfilled promises especially on the part of UNITA in implementing the successive timetables for the completion of key military and political issues, decided to pressurize them and not to entertain their excuses. Due to this situation, the program completely lagged behind. In the light of the mandate, the UN decided to terminate the mission on 30th June 1997.

### **Lessons learnt**

Protracted conflicts are difficult to resolve. Robust mandates are required to achieve results in a mission.

## **D. MONUA (UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA)**

## **Background**

The United Nations observer mission in Angola was an aftermath of UNVEM III following the signing of the Lusaka protocol in November 1994. The peace process in Angola achieved some progress resulting in a period of relative peace. Active dialogue was maintained at various levels and led to the formation of the Joint Armed Force (FAA) as well as the government of unity and National reconciliation.

With the completion of many tasks by UNAVEM III and when its scheduled life span had ended, it was terminated. In order to continue with the peace process activities in Angola, the UN decided to establish its successor in the name of United Nations Observer Mission in Angola. It was established with a purpose to help in the consolidation of peace and National reconciliation, enhance confidence building and in creating an environment conducive to long term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.

## **Agreements**

MONUA was an establishment which came about from the Lusaka protocol and Bicesse accords. Its coming into being was merely to continue the activities which were begun during the UNAVEM III period in order not to leave a vacuum after UNAVEM III was terminated.

## **Mandate**

The mandate of MONUA was established by the Security Council Resolution 118 (1997) of 30th June 1997 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its overall mandate was to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creation of an environment conducive to long term stability, democratic development and the rehabilitation of the country. The mandate had tailored aspects to be addressed in the areas of politics, police matters, human rights, military and humanitarian aspects.

The authors of the mandate were very careful and cautious over the situation in Angola. As can be seen from the mandate an attempt was being made to consolidate gains obtained during the UNAVEM III period. For such situations, they extended the mandate with as much hope that things would improve. UNITA was the main problem as it kept on violating the agreed issues. This situation took things too far and completely frustrated the government of Angola. With no alternative on their side, the government of Angola's pessimism crept in and made a decision to completely kick out MONUA.

## **Termination of the mission**

The security situation in Angola had continued to deteriorate. This was justified from the fact that due to non-adherence to the dictates of the agreements, the peace process had collapsed and the country was in a state of war. MONUA in this

situation had no option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceeded with an orderly repatriation of its personnel and property. The developments indicated that the parties wanted to test their fortunes on the battlefield. With such a scenario MONUA, was not able to carry out its mandate as the security situation had worsened. This meant that conditions for a meaningful UN peacekeeping role had ceased to exist.

### **Troop contributing countries**

The TCCs were generally the ones who took part in UNAVEM III. The reason for the force mix was basically to justify the international commitment to assist in an attempt to bring peace to Angola

### **The mission activities ( implementation)**

MONUA activities were mainly to focus on the three major pending tasks which were - Demilitarization of UNITA Forces, Normalization of state administration throughout the national territory and the transformation of the UNITA radio. It was also experienced as the operation went on, that there was continued existence of UNITA militants and as such the need to stabilize the political situation presented serious challenges to national reconciliation and reconstruction. In noticing, this the UN, with the support of the three observer states (Portugal, Soviet Union and USA) continued to play a pivotal role in helping the two signatories to the Lusaka protocol overcome their deep rooted mutual mistrust.

Situations kept changing during the MONUA period and in order to make for the situation, up it was also noted that the Angolan government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate which was to expire on 26th February 1999. On 27 January 1999, the Angolan government informed UN that in its view a continued multi-disciplinary presence of the organization in Angola was not necessary. On 26th February 1999 the Security Council adopted a resolution 1229 (1999) and endorsed the liquidation of MONUA.

### **Lessons learnt**

A UN charter mandate should be matched with the force deployed.

## **CASE 4: SADC MILITARY INTERVENTION OPERATION IN LESOTHO**

### **Background**

The military intervention in Lesotho took place from 22 September 1998 in an effort to deal with the deteriorating security situation in Lesotho. The operation primarily resulted from the dissatisfaction of the opposition parties who were demanding that King Letsie III to use his powers to dismantle the parliament as they had believed that it had been fraudulently elected.

In light of this situation, mutinous members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers, hijacked government vehicles, closed the broadcasting station and had the prime

minister and other ministries virtually held hostage. The Lesotho police lost control of the situation and as such neighbouring countries such as South Africa thought that a military coup had taken place.

### **Agreements**

There was formal agreement which was entered into merit the operation in Lesotho. The only agreements which appear to have been binding for the operation were the status of force agreements between Lesotho and South Africa and Lesotho and Botswana. This scenario created a problem in that a SADC force was not in this context available and as such as situation made the operation difficult to be categorized as one conducted under the SADC mandate.

### **Mandate**

The mandate for the operation was not very clear. The reason for this could be that it was really not very clear as to who had authorized it to be carried out. The main objectives of the military intervention were to neutralize and disarm the mutinous elements from the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) where after stability was to be maintained while the primary objective was to preempt a military coup by the mutinous soldiers in Lesotho. The order of events in this context is very surprising as it can be seen that the mention of the UN or AU and even the SADC itself is not heard anywhere else in as far as a mandate was concerned.

### **Troop contributing countries**

The countries who contributed troops were South Africa and Botswana. South Africa contributed 600 troops while Botswana contributed 200 troops.

### **Mission activities (implementation)**

The mission activities of operation were not many. As a combined force, they were to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order. In this regard then, the forces whilst in the mission area were involved with locating and identifying destabilizers and their resources, disarming and containing them and where it was necessary, striking where applicable with the necessary force to eliminate the threat.

It is however surprising that despite these activities being carried out in the operation area, wide spread arson, violence occurred in Lesotho while the task force troops were there. This leaves people to question if the force was really effective and also if it really was prepared to meet the challenges of the operation.

### **Termination of the mission**

The Boleas operation troops pulled out of Lesotho in May 1999 which was exactly seven months after the commencement of the operation. It is commented superficially that the operation got terminated after it has satisfactorily met its mandate. How far true this is correct, history may be the best judge.

### **Lessons learnt**

Peace support operations should have clear mandates from the UN and regional bodies.

### **Summary of case studies**

Countries in SADC have and still continue to experience violent conflicts arising from internal disagreements. In accordance with the provisions of the SADC Treaty, member States agreed to cooperate in the area of politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security (Article 11). The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security further (Article 11) defines the scope of cooperation within the confines of the UN Charter on the use of force. In spite of the political will by SADC, almost all peace support missions have been carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, with minimal contribution of mission force from SADC member states. This begs the question on how SADC countries are fully committed to solving their own problems.

Whilst SADC has the capacity, political will and opportunity to address certain conflicts, e.g. the Lesotho situation which is the focus of this paper, others such as the Angolan conflict has been the primary focus of the UN. Four countries of SADC have been selected in order to provide an historic overview of the experience of SADC in managing peace and conflict. These are DRC, Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho. Lessons drawn out will provide a basis for policy recommendations to inform current SADC practice regarding PSO.

The following table is used for analysis:

Table 1. Comparative analysis of PSO in four SADC countries

Country experiencing conflict	Mandate for Peacekeeping (UN, AU, SADC or other)	Neighbouring States	Countries contributing Peacekeepers	Outcome
Lesotho (Political power and economic disparities)	SADC(1998): Status of Forces Agreement between Lesotho and South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana	South Africa	<b>South Africa and Botswana</b> , both being SADC countries	Peace after mutineers were disabled and reorganisation of the assembly
Angola (Civil war over diamonds)	Portugal (Unlilitary 1961-1975) UN (1994-2002)	Namibia, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo	23 countries from around the globe three SADC <b>Zimbabwe. Tanzania, Zambia</b>	Peace after death of UNITA leader and demobilization
Mozambique (Civil war between factions on ideology)	UN (1992 - 1995)	Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia	39 Countries from all over the world including <b>Botswana and Zambia from SADC</b>	Peace after demobilization, deployment of police component and vocational training for militants
DRC (Civil war over diamonds and other minerals)	1996-98 SADC (Angola and South Africa) and UN	Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Angola, Sudan, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo	56 countries from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, North America, South America including <b>Malawi, South Africa, Madascar and Zambia from SADC</b>	Partial peace after reformation of the security sector, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration/ rehabilitation of former combatants into society, training and integration of armed forces into brigades for securing elections and the formation of a DRC national defence force.

## **Typology of Peacekeepers in SADC**

Each case of peace building is different depending on conflict scenario, history, level of violence and resources available (Batchelor et al, 2004). Peacekeeping operations are sometimes initiated and led by individual states, acting either unilaterally or as pivotal states acting in tandem with others. Regional hegemony leads peacekeeping forces in order to press their own claims to economic benefits or access to natural resources or support socio-political ambitions of allies, e.g. Botswana and South Africa's intervention into Lesotho. It can also be argued that regional hegemony may have a good understanding of the dynamics of the conflict they are trying to manage. Other interventions are carried out by unilateral interveners and pivotal states that may be former colonial powers. E.g. Portugal intervention in Angola in support of the colonial government.

In Table 2, it is observed that peacekeepers in the case studies were not necessarily members of neighbouring states. In almost all by cases, except Lesotho, peacekeepers mobilised by the UN came from all continents. In very rare cases do peacekeepers come from a contiguous state. Some would argue that if a conflict occurred in or between two SADC countries, then SADC should be the first to respond. If they fail to resolve the conflict, they should call on the OAU to assist, and so on until the UN is called on in the last instance (Cedric). However, the reality is very different as can be seen in the cases above. SADC has had limited success in mobilizing peacekeepers, even when fully mandated to do so through Chapter VIII of the Charter.

## **Lessons learnt from case studies**

Wherever possible, the UN and regional organizations should support the creation of liberal democracies as the best route to stable peace. From the four case studies we learn that;

- Peace support operations have been partly shaped by the nature of conflict and global economic and political context. Whatever the case, the outcome of a peace support operation is an attempt to enforce a political agreement between warring parties. The SADC or UN mandate for intervention need to be carefully designed to meet has been agreed in the agreements
- It is inevitable that PSO approach may combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks should a ceasefire breakdown, like it happened in Lesotho. PSO concept insists that it is possible to use force in a peacekeeping mission without losing impartiality. However, it is also important that a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian elements and civilian policing (**Belamy et al, 2004: p6**) should be included, as was the case in Mozambique. Military intervention is contingent upon substantial external assistance, as has been shown in DRC.

- The other aspect that need consideration is SADC's relationship with the OAU and the UN. The question is, should SADC inform the OAU of its intentions prior to undertaking PSO? If SADC is going to undertake enforcement operations, as was the case most recently in Lesotho and the DRC, is it going to seek prior authorization from the UN Security Council as required under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter?

## **Recommendation**

1. The Troika needs to be proactive in its response to peacekeeping, having seen early warnings of conflict. SADC response to peacekeeping appears to be triggered once UN has come in to help when in fact the UN should be channeling peacekeepers through the regional body.
2. SADC needs to develop Charters for governing the conduct of peace support missions in its regions. This would not by any means usurp the powers of United Nations' resolutions, but SADC needs to have a regional voice when such resolutions regarding peace missions and contribution of forces are made for its region.
3. The Organ should institute a decision making process that would approve a mission under SADC auspices in a timely manner and consequently, quicken the process of intervention in order to save lives and property. Such a decision-making process could be facilitated through the Interstate Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting of Defence Ministers, for instance (which was the level at which the DRC Mission was approved) or through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security at the Foreign Minister level, or SADC Summit level.
4. Currently the UN bares the full brunt of the cost of PSO. SADC needs to take its own initiative in deciding how SADC Missions should be financed. If donor money will be accepted, principles that should govern the relationship between the donors and the SADC mission to ensure that only SADC should be the one to clarify the kind of missions to be mandated, be it peacekeeping, military observers, civilian observers, human rights monitoring missions, peace enforcement, enforcement or military interventions
5. While as it is a fact that you cannot make peace and war with the same people on the same territory at the same time (**Tharour et al , 2001**), SADC needs to learn from the UN example of taking a strong position when parties in a conflict appear not to honour agreements. A passive approach to conflict resolution may signal of weakness on the part of the SADC institution and, thus give strength to aggressors to perpetuate conflict.

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